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A. FERREBEE IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARlfr OF ENHANCEMENT VALUE 
FOR PROXIMITY TO THE AIRPORT 
The lower court erred in awarding an enhancement value to 
Ferrebee because of the proximity of his property to the Airport. 
The lower Court awarded Ferrebee an enhancement value which more 
that doubled the value of his property. R. 410. The lower 
court's erroneous conclusion to make such an award is reviewed on 
a correction of error or de novo standard because contrary to the 
claims of Ferrebee the question of the aw&rd of an enhancement is 
a question of law. United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 19-21 
n.14 (1970). 
A property owner cannot claim enhancement value for property 
taken in a second, completely separate, condemnation action where 
the property was "probably within the scojpe of the project . . 
."(emphasis added). United States v. Milder, 317 U.S. 369, 377 
(1942). 
If a landowner's property increases in value 
because of the government projedt, the 
government need not pay this enhancement 
s not within value unless (1) the property wa 
the original scope of the projeqt; or (2) the 
public with 
cope, see 
government failed to provide the 
adequate notice of the project s 
United States v. 2353.28 Acres of Land, 414 
F.2d 965 (5th Circ. 1969); or (3) the 
landowner reasonably believed that subsequent 
government action removed the property from 
the project scope (citations omitted). 
United States v. 49.01 Acres of Land, 669 p.2d 1364, 1367 (10th 
Circ. 1982). Ferrebee makes no claim that the government failed 
to provide him notice of the project scope because it was 
1 
sufficient for the government to put him on notice by publicly 
disclosing its plans which indicated a contemplated use of his 
property in the project. JId. at 1368. As to Ferrebee's 
remaining arguments, that his property was not within the 
original scope of the plan or that it had been removed by 
subsequent action, the courts have always placed a "heavy burden" 
on landowners to prove such claims. JTd. In this instance there 
is absolutely no evidence to support Ferrebee's arguments and the 
lower court made specific findings of fact contrary to his 
assertions. 
Ferrebee wrongly and confusingly argues that his property 
was "not contemplated" in the original planning. See Appeal 
Brief p. 21.l The lower court made a specific finding of fact 
that, "The county's original airport layout plan for the airport 
included approximately sixty-eight (68) acres of Ferrebee's 
eighty (80) acre parcel. Approximately twelve (12) of the 
Ferrebee acres were not included in the county's original plan. 
. . . . On May 16, 1986, after the initial construction of the 
airport, the County filed this action to condemn the remaining 
forty-three (43) acres of the Ferrebee property (the "Subject 
1
 Ferrebee tries to imply that because the initial 
construction of the Airport was only a partial construction of the 
full plan that the rest of the Airport development was an expansion 
project un-anticipated by the original plan. See appeal Brief, p. 
21. Ferrebee cites nothing from the record that would support this 
implication. In fact the record indicates that at all times 
relevant to the development of the Airport all of Ferrebee's 
property was targeted for taking. R. 435, at 26, 34, 35, 62, 67, 
148, 158, 160, 202, 207-208, 238. 
2 
Property")." R. 412. The record is uniform and replete with 
reference to the fact that from the very inception of the idea 
for the airport all 80 acres of the parcel owned by Ferrebee were 
designated for acquisition. R. 435, at 26, 34, 35, 62, 67, 148, 
158, 160, 202, 207-208, 238.2 
The lower court's finding accurately reflects the fact that 
68 acres of the Ferrebee property were included within the 
boundary set for the construction of the airport as originally 
planned. The record also makes it clear that the remaining 12 
acres, not included within the actual construction of the Airport 
was an uneconomic remainder in the form ot a strip of land 100 
feet wide by approximately a mile and a h£lf long which the 
county understood would have to be acquired because it was 
landlocked and could not be put to any re£l use by the owner. 
Id. Through its various developmental phases and modifications 
at no point did the county determine to t^ke less than the full 
acreage owned by Ferrebee. There is no evidence in the record, 
and Ferrebee cites none, that the scope off the original project 
was "abandoned." 
Ferrebee tries to imply that because only part of his 
property was taken in the first condemnation proceeding in 1976 
that this "clearly expressed an alteration!" from the original 
2
 While Ferrebee argues that "During the course of planning 
and construction of the airport under the original plan the 
acquisition of additional land was not dontemplated", he cites 
nothing from the record to support this allegation. See Appeal 
Brief, p. 21. 
plan as to create a reasonable expectation that his property had 
been removed from the project scope. United States v. 49.01 
Acres of Land, supra, at 1376. This implication is neither 
support by the facts of this case or the law.3 The record 
reflects that the Ferrebee property was always designated for 
acquisition. Furthermore, the record indicates that only part of 
Ferrebee's property was taken in the first condemnation action 
because the County did not have the money to purchase all of his 
property the first time around. R. 435, at 123. The County's 
inability to acquire all of Ferrebee's land in the first 
proceeding does not, as a matter of law, establish a removal of 
the property from the original project or give Ferrebee a 
reasonable belief that his property had been removed from the 
scope of the project/ For example, in the United States v. 
65.0 Acres of Land, 728 F.2d 417 (10th Circ., 1984), the court 
addressed the issue of the government's acquisition of an 
"uneconomic remainder" which was not condemned in the first 
Ferrebee cites no reference to the recorded to either 
establish or justify his now claimed expectation that his property 
was not designated to be taken by the County. Furthermore, there 
was never any evidence illicite at trial which would substantiate 
a claim that the County had abandoned its intention to acquire 
Ferrebee's property. 
A
 It is important to note that Ferrebee never testified that 
he thought that his property had been removed from the scope of the 
project, nor that he ever believed , at any point, that the County 
did not want all his land for the Airport project. Furthermore, 
Ferrebee cites nothing from the record to support a contention that 
he did not expect the County to acquire the remainder of his 
property by condemnation, or other wise, after the first 
condemnation action was begun. 
4 
condemnation proceeding because of insufficient funds. The court 
held that 
One of the basic premises underlying Miller 
and its progeny is that the government should 
not, could not, be expected to condemn all of 
the land needed for a particular project at 
the same time. The testimony at trial was 
that the government did not condemn the 32.5 
acres because 
ter of law, 
acres when it condemned the 515 
of insufficient funds. As a ma 
such actions in and of themselves do not 
remove land from the scope of tjie project. 
Id. at 420. 
From the unequivocal findings of the lower Court at least 32 
of the acres involved in this condemnation action were within the 
scope of the Airport project from the beginning.3 Furthermore, 
the record also supports the fact that the remaining 12 acres was 
an uneconomic remainder which the County recognized that it would 
have to acquire as part of its development of the Airport.6 
5
 Ferrebee's statement that "Acquisition of the subject 
property in the second condemnation was thus not within the scope 
of the original project, nor was it within Ferrebee's reasonable 
expectations" Appeal Brief, p. 23, is a blatant mis-statement of 
the facts of this case and the findings of the lower court. 
6
 Ferrebee's counsel proposed in the initial proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Submitted to the lower 
court paragraphs which tried to cast the pounty's taking of his 
property as two separate takings unrelated to an overall plan for 
development of the Airport. These proposed findings were objected 
to by the County on the basis that all Ferrebee's land was 
projected for taking from the inception of the Airport plan and 
that nothing changed or varied that fact. R. 335, 369. The lower 
court's finding that the 1976 condemnation action is unrelated to 
the 1986 action is not, as Ferrebee tries to imply a finding that 
the property condemned in 1986 was not within the scope of the 
original project. The lower court made as its first finding of 
fact that Ferrebee's property was identified for taking from the 
beginning. R. 409. 
5 
Because the Ferrebee property was always contemplated for 
acquisition, no award for enhancement of his property for its 
proximity to the Airport can be awarded as a matter of law. The 
lower court clearly erred in making such an award. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ADOPTING FERREBEE'S 
APPRAISAL AS THE BEST ESTIMATE OF HIS PROPERTY'S FAIR MARKET 
VALUE 
Not only is Ferrebee's appraisers' appraisal defective as a 
matter of law because he provides an enhancement value for 
Ferrebee's property's because of its projected used in 
conjunction with the Airport, the lower court abused it's 
discretion in accepting Ferrebee's appraisal as the best estimate 
of the fair market value because it failed to prove the 
property's alleged higher and better use and in failing to strike 
portions of his appraisal because it was based on incompetent and 
inadmissable evidence. 
1. FERREBEE DID NOT CARRY HIS BURDEN OF PROOF AS TO A 
HIGHER AND BETTER USE 
From the record, it is clear that Ferrebee's property is and 
has always be€*n used for agricultural purpose. The County 
appraisers value the property based on its agricultural use, and 
Ferrebee's appraisers contended that it had a higher and better 
use, in conjunction with the Airport. Ferrebee has the burden of 
proof to establish a claimed higher and better use which he 
failed to do. 
In State v. Jacobs, 397 P.2d 463, 464 (Utah 1964), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that "the owner of property under a 
6 
condemnation is entitled to a value baseti upon the highest and 
best use to which it could be put at the time of the taking, 
without limitation as to the use then actually made of it. 
However, the projected use affecting a value, must be not only 
possible, but reasonably probable. It miist not be merely in the 
realm of speculation because the land is adaptable to a 
particular use in the remote and uncertain future." As was 
demonstrated in the County's opening bri&f Ferrebee failed to 
establish the three elements of feasibility to support his claim 
of a higher and better use.7 
Because Ferrebee's property was always anticipated as being 
included within the final development of the airport, analysis of 
its higher and better use can not be premised on the idea that it 
would be used in conjunction with the airport. Even assuming 
that future airport use, e.g., commercial or industrial 
development, could be taken into consideration, Ferrebee had to 
demonstrate that the three elements of feasibility existed for 
that higher and better use. In this instance, the elements that 
7
 Ferrebee contends that the three Elements of feasibility 
referenced in the County's brief are merely academic dialogue and 
not based in relevant law. The three part test is clearly a part 
referred to by the County has firm footing jln case law derived from 
this and other jurisdictions. See, Brink^rhoff, Eminent Domain; 
Proving Highest and Best Use of Undeveloped! Land in Utah, 1973 Utah 
L. Rev. , 705 (1973 Wand the cases cited tjherein): Movie v. Salt 
Lake City, 176 P.2d 582 (Utah 1947); State v. Jacobs, 397 P.2d 463 
(Utah 1964). Furthermore, that three part test, is the very 
backbone of the analysis of Mr. Ferrebee's appraiser. He cites the 
three factors in is appraisal as those which must be met to 
establish the property's highest and best use. R. 434, at 11 
Exhibits 91 and 92. 
7 
are most notably lacking are those relating to legal and economic 
feasibility. 
It is well recognized that the landowner carries the burden 
of establishing that there is a reasonable likelihood that zoning 
will be changed to permit the proposed higher and better use. 
State v. Jacobs, supra. It is also understood and accepted that 
proving "the existence of a reasonable probability by means of 
expert opinion has been held to be impermissible, since this 
involves prognostication of future legislative action." 7 
Nichols Law of Eminent Domain, Sec. 12C.03[3]. Furthermore, the 
clear evidence before the court as provided by the County 
Director of Development established that where the Ferrebee 
property was to ultimately be incorporated within the actual 
physical development of the airport, the likelihood or 
probability of a zoning change was zero. Where the county zoning 
ordinances precluded the higher and better use proposed by 
Ferrebee, the court could not consideration the proposed higher 
and better use unless the legal feasibility was established. The 
record is devoid of any evidence to support Ferrebee's contention 
that the zoning would have been change to permit his proposed 
use. 
As to the economic feasibility of the proposed higher and 
better use, Ferrebee contends that the focus is only on the 
reasonable probability of the use. Appellate Brief at 26. 
Important in the consideration of the reasonableness of the 
8 
probability of the proposed higher and bfetter use is the use 
"must not be merely in the realm of speculation because the land 
is adaptable to a particular use in the remote and uncertain 
future." State v. Jacobs, supra/ at 464• All of the evidence 
that is represented by Ferrebee to substantiate a reasonable 
probability of his proposed use relate atfe his appraiser's review 
of aviation studies that were thoroughly and completely rejected 
by the county. Furthermore, at the time of the condemnation 
action, there was absolutely no viable market for the use 
proposed by Mr. Ferrebee. R. 435, at 155, 305-6; R. 434, at 127. 
State v. Hopkins, 29 Utah 2d 131, 506 P. ?d 57 (1973), State vs. 
Tedesco, 4 Utah 2d 248, 291 P. 2d 1028 (1956). The fact that 
there was no viable market for his proposed use was in fact 
recognized by Ferrebee's appraisers. R. 439, at 795, Exhibit 21, 
p.6; R. 434, at 128. Specifically, Mr. Cook conceded that there 
was no demand for commercial development in or near the airport 
and that his conclusions as to future possible uses were merely 
"forward thinking". R. 434, at 11, Exhibit 91, p. 28. Ferrebee 
has failed to carry his burden of proof as to the higher and 
better use upon which he bases his appraisal. 
2. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ADMITTING THE 
COOK APPRAISAL BECAUSE IT IS BASpD ON INCOMPETENT AND 
INADMISSABLE EVIDENCE. 
Ferrebee attempts to avoid the county's arguments concerning 
the improper basis for his expert's appraisal by contending that 
the inadmissible and hearsay evidence used in his appraisal was 
9 
not intended to be direct substantive evidence of the property's 
value but instead merely supports and corroborates the opinion of 
the expert. This argument misses the point. The lower court 
admitted into evidence Phil Cook's appraisal and then accepted 
the appraisal as the basis for its findings as to fair market 
value.8 R. 411. First, it must be understood that the 
approach taken by Ferrebee's appraiser was to provide a 
comparable sale valuation. The very heart of such an appraisal 
is the selection of property which is "reasonably comparable". 
"The requirement is that a [comparable sale] meet the test of 
"reasonable comparability.' That is, that these factors exist in 
sufficient similarity that the sale can fairly be regarded as 
having some probative value in arriving at a proper appraisal of 
the property", Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake v. Mitsui, Inc. 
522 P.2d 1370, 1373 (Utah 1979). 
It must be remembered, however, that the comparison is 
made with lands which are similar to the land taken. 
Of course, only such parcels may be compared where the 
dissimilarities are reduced to a minimum and allowances 
made for such dissimilarities. It is, therefore, 
imperative to consider such differences as may exist in 
a physical and environmental condition and in proper 
allowance made to cover any differential that may exist 
by virtue of the difference in the time of the sale. 
It is evident that there may be considerable difference 
in the size, shape, situation, and immediate 
surroundings of two estates, and perhaps in other 
respects, an enterprise in which one bought may be a 
8
 The lower court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
read: "The appraisal of Phil Cook, Ferrebee's appraiser, is the 
best estimate of the fair market value of the Subject Property, and 
it is adopted by the Court as the true market value of the Subject 
Property." R. 411. 
10 
substantial assistance in determining tne value of the other. 
5 Nichols, Law of Eminent Domain/ Sec. 2JL.3 [1], page 231 
(Emphasis in original). Thus, the critical inquiry that must be 
made is whether the property is truly comparable. In this 
instance, evidence concerning an enhancement value to the 
property was provided in the Phil Cook's appraisal which was 
premised on inadmissable hearsay opinion^ which could not be 
examined and whose reliability could not be attested to. 
The process that Mr. Cook used to anrive at his "enhancement 
value" was to contact individuals, whose credentials and 
experience in valuing property was unknown, and inquired 
concerning sales of property located near rural airports. R. 
434, at 167-8. To establish that the salfes included a particular 
value for proximity to an airport he then inquired as to that 
individual's opinion as to what similar property not adjacent to 
their airport sold for. R. 434, at 167-8 * Once that opinion was 
solicited, the difference between that property and the sale 
neighboring the airport was calculated, and became the basis for 
enhancement value to be applied to Ferreb^e's property. R. 434, 
Exhibit 91, pp. 42-43. 
While Rule 703 of the Utah Rules of Evidence allows an 
expert to testify from hearsay "facts and data", it does not, and 
should not, permit an appraiser to shield the essential questions 
of comparability behind the opinion of another. In this 
instance, the comparability of the properties used to establish 
the enhancement factor was based on another's analysis. The 
11 
reliability and credibility of that essential analysis was beyond 
the scope of cross examination and beyond the investigation of 
the court. Warren v. Waterville Urban Renewal Authority, 235 
A.2d 295, cert, denied, 390 U.S. 1006. The lower court abused 
its discretion in permitting into evidence Cook's appraisal 
without striking the inadmissable hearsay evidence. 
Furthermore, much of the information provided as to actual 
sales near other rural airports involved amounts that were paid 
under the threat of condemnation or as a final award in a 
condemnation action. It is recognized that amounts paid through 
condemnation are not an appropriate basis for the calculation of 
fair market value. Such information should not be admitted for 
the purpose of determining value. See cases cited in County's 
opening brief page 32.9 
Honolulu Redevelopment Agency v. Pun Gun, 426 P. 2d 324, 
(Hawaii 196 7) cited by Ferrebee in support of his contention that 
awards in condemnation may be admitted in evidence to demonstrate 
value under a comparable sales approach does not go as far as 
Ferrebee claims. "The better view is that such evidence should not 
be automatically underlined excluded as a matter of law. If it can 
be shown to the satisfaction of the trial court that the price paid 
was sufficiently voluntary to be a reasonable index of value or 
that there is a necessity for the evidence because the only sales 
of comparable property in the area in recent years have been to the 
condemnor, such evidence should be admitted." Id.., at 325. This 
position appears to be a minority view. Furthermore, Ferrebee did 
not demonstrate that the prices paid in those condemnation actions 
were sufficiently voluntary to be either reliable or competent. 
12 
C. THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY LIMITED FERREBEE'S RECOVERY BECAUSE 
HIS PROPERTY WAS LANDLOCKED 
Ironically, Ferrebee challenges the lower court's 
calculation of the reduction in value of his property for lack of 
access- Ferrebee contests the court's calculation of the lack of 
access based on what Ferrebee contends i$ an inadmissable option 
agreement. Ferrebee's claim is ironic because the option 
agreement referred to by the lower court in its Findings of Fact 
was concocted by his own attorneys to enhance the value of his 
property in preparation for this litigation. R. 439, at 658-66. 
The creation of the option is also ironic because Ferrebee had to 
state a value for the property to be acquired for access which 
would approximate the amount that he was Remanding for his 
property in order to justly his demands. When that option was 
then presented to demonstrate that access was available for the 
property, the lower court felt compelled to accept that option, 
not as an assessment of the property's fair market value, but as 
the actual cost of access which had been hegotiate by Ferrebee. 
Besides the irony created by Ferrebee's argument, his claims are 
without force because he did not object td the introduction in 
evidence of the option at the time of trictl/ and did not raise 
the issue of the inadmissability of the option when the lower 
court made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Finally, 
contrary to Ferrebee's argument the option was not admitted as 
evidence of fair market value of Ferrebee'Is property but was 
introduced to demonstrate what Ferrebee had negotiated to provide 
13 
access to his property. In any event, regardless of the 
admissability of the option, Ferrebee's own appraiser, Phil Cook, 
who was relied upon by the lower court to establish fair market 
value, for the property, stated that the Ferrebee property was 
subject to a deduction in the same amount as the option because 
it was land locked. R. 411, 434, at 11, Exhibits 91 and 92, pp 
40-42. Mr. Cook arrived at that same deduction based on 
considerations which were independent from the option.10 
At the time the documents reflecting the option for access 
were offered in evidence, and the testimony relating to that 
option was accepted by the court, Ferrebee's counsel did not 
object to the admissibility of that evidence.11 In addition, at 
the end of the trial the lower court requested that Ferrebee's 
counsel prepare proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
in keeping with the lower court's Bench Ruling. Several drafts 
of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were prepared by 
Ferrebee's counsel, objections to the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law were submitted by the County and argued before 
the lower court. At no time did Ferrebee's counsel ever object 
10
 Both of the appraisers provided by the County determined 
that the Ferrebee property was landlocked and an appropriate 
deduction was made. It is important to note that the County's 
appraisers and Ferrebee's appraiser, Phil Cook, agreed that the 
appropriate deduction was $19,400. R. 439, at 554, Exhibit 17; R. 
437, at 370, Exhibit 11; R. R. 434, at 11, Exhibits 91 and 92. 
11
 The County in a pre-trial Motion in Limine moved to have 
evidence of the option excluded from evidence. Ferrebee actively 
objected to the County's Motion, and the lower court declined to 
excluded the €>vidence. R. 177 and 196. 
14 
to the court's use of to the option on tlie basis that it was 
inadmissable or for any other reason, and the final Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, as prepared by Ferrebee's counsel, 
was signed by the court incorporating the lower court's use of 
the option. R, 334, 367A, 398, 403, 416, 418, Ferrebee never 
raised the with the lower court the issue that it is now raising 
on appeal. "[I]n order to preserve a plea of error, the alleged 
error must have been raised seasonably by counsel to the trial 
court. The purpose of this rule is to alllow the trial court to 
correct any error, if error there be." U^ah County v. Brown, 672 
P.2d 83, 85 (Utah 1983), Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 
786 P.2d 1350 (Utah App. 1990), Mascaro v< Davis, 741 P.2d 938 
(Utah 1987). By not raising this issue with the lower court 
Ferrebee has waived his right to raise it now. Utah County v. 
Brown, supra. 
Regardless of the admissibility of the option in determining 
the final fair market value of the property (it should be noted, 
however, that the option was not admitted for the purpose of 
determining fair market value, but for the purpose of 
establishing access to the property negotiated and provided by 
Ferrebee) Ferrebee's own appraiser, disregarded Ferrebee's option 
for access and using other comparables arrJLved at a deduction 
because the property was landlocked. The Reduction was almost 
exactly the same value as the option price+ Ferrebee's 
appraiser, Phil Cook, determined that it w^s appropriate to 
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reduce the base agricultural value of the property by $19,400 
because the property was landlocked. In his testimony to the 
court, and in his appraisal, he indicated that he examined the 
impact of the property being landlocked from several different 
perspectives, including the negotiated access at $5,000 per acre 
and concluded: "there are inherent risks associated with 
purchasing landlocked property. A prudent investor would 
discount the price to reflect these risks. The discount in this 
case would likely range from a nominal amount to 37%." R. 434, 
at 11 Exhibits 91 and 92, pp 40-4 2. Mr. Cook went on to state 
that: "In this case, there is as much evidence to suggest a 
nominal discount as to suggest a large discount of 37%. 
Nevertheless, a prudent investor would be conservative in 
concluding this cost. A full 37% discount is applied." R. at 
11, Exhibit 92, p. 43. 
The lower court relied on Ferrebee's evidence of his own 
dealing to provided access to his otherwise landlocked property 
in determining what deductions were appropriate. The access 
provided by way of option would cost the County $19,400. 
Ferrebee's own appraiser concluded that the fair market value of 
the property necessitated a discount because it was landlocked, 
based on his independent assessment, of an amount which was 
comparable to the option. Thus, regardless of how the amount was 
arrived at, it was appropriate that the property be discounted 
because it was landlocked. 
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D. FERREBEE IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARfr OF ATTORNEYS FEES 
Utah law permits an award of attorneys fees under only two 
conditions— where they are provided for by contract or 
statute,12 Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149^ 151 (Utah 1983). 
Ferrebee sought an award of attorneys fe^s in the lower court 
under Utah Code Annotated §78-27-56 for bad faith conduct of the 
County in its initiating this condemnation action. The lower 
court in its Bench Ruling rejected Ferrekfee's request stating, "I 
am denying them under that section becaus|e I think that the 
county's actions as far as the straight condemnation case were 
not that bad." R. 431, at 6. No attorney's fees were awarded by 
the lower court. 
The lower court as part of its Bench Ruling held that with 
regard to claims made by Ferrebee under the Utah Relocation 
Assistance Act, Utah Code §57-12-1, et. seft, and the Uniform 
Relocation Assistance and Land Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 
42 U.S.C. §4601, et seg, (hereafter referred to as the State and 
Federal Relocation Assistance Acts), thos0 acts did not apply in 
this case.13 The Court went on to commented that "The Court is 
12
 Attorneys fees are "non-compensable as 'just compensation'" 
in condemnation actions; "compensation for such costs . . . in a 
condemnation action is a matter of legislative prerogative and must 
be provided by statute." Redevelopment Agency v. Daskalas, 785 
P.2d 112, 1123 (Utah App. 19 89)(citations and footnotes omitted). 
13
 The lower court held in its Conclusions of Law that "the 
Utah Relocation Assistance Act, Utah Code §57-12-1, et. seg. does 
not apply to this case" and that "the Uniform Relocation Assistance 
and Land Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §4601, et 
seg. , does not apply to this case." R. 409-10. The Relocation 
Assistance Acts are meant to apply only where a person is 
"displaced", from his property by the ac^ of the condemnation, 
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of the opinion that if the State and Federal Relocation Act did 
apply, that attorney fees may be applicable. But based on the 
otherwise, I would not award attorney fees in this case." R. 
4 31, at 3, 5. When pressed further as to whether the court 
would award attorneys fees if the State and Federal Relocation 
Acts applied, the court stated, "Well, I'll indicate to you that 
I would be inclined to award attorneys fees. But, I hesitate to 
say that, and I am not ruling that way because of the fact that I 
don't want this to be an appeal just to get some attorneys fees. 
So I'm not saying that I will definitively do it, but I am saying 
that that is the way I was looking at it." R. 431, at 6. 
Apparently tantalized by the lower courts observations Ferrebee 
has now proceeded to do exactly as the lower court feared, he 
filed this appeal for the purpose of seeking attorney's fees. 
The review of a trial court's decision to refuse an award 
of attorneys fees is reviewable on an abuse of discretion 
standard. Canyon Country Stores v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 421 
(Utah 1989). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying attorney's fees in this instance. 
First it should be noted that the State and Federal 
Relocation Assistance Acts do not create an independent basis for 
i.e., the land owner is removed from his place of residence or 
business. In this instance, Ferrebee's property was raw land on 
which he neither carried on a business or had a place of residence, 
thus he was not displaced within the meaning of the act. Where the 
Acts did not apply to this condemnation action, the procedural 
safeguard of the act are neither applicable to nor binding on the 
county. 
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an award of attorneys fees. See, Utah Code §57-12-1, et seq, and 
42 U.S.C. §4601, et seq. Even if those Acts applied to the facts 
of this case, which the lower court found that they do not, R. 
431, at 2, they do not permit the court to award attorneys fees. 
See, Cady v. Johnson, supra. 
Ferrebee tries to boot-strap the lower courts findings that 
even though the State and Federal Relocation Assistance Acts do 
not apply that the County did not follow their procedures to 
create the implication that the County acted in bad faith in 
bring this action. The lower court refused to make the very 
finding that Ferrebee is trying to establish by implication, and 
there is certainly nothing in the record which indicates that the 
lower court abused its discretion in so ruling. 
An award of attorneys fees under §78-27-56 requires the 
finding of "two elements . . . first, the claim must be without 
merit", and the "plaintiff's conduct in bringing suit was lacking 
in good faith." Cady v. Johnson, supra, at 151. Neither of 
these elements are found in this case, and the specific findings 
of the court support its determination that none should be 
awarded. 
"Without merit" is defined by the Utah court as "bordering 
on frivolity" or "of little weight or importance having no basis 
of law or fact." Cady v. Johnson, supra. There is nothing in 
the record that would indicate that the County's suit for 
condemnation was frivolous or has no basis in law and fact. 
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Apparently, Ferrebee does not even contend that such is the case. 
Rather, Ferrebee completely ignores this element of the test and 
focuses solely on the second requirement that the suit be lacking 
in good faith. 
Lacking in good faith is defined as 
(1) an honest belief in the propriety of the 
activities in question; (2) no intent to take 
unconscionable advantage of others; and (3) 
no intent to, or knowledge of the fact that 
the activities in question will hinder, delay 
or defraud others. 
Cady v. Johnson, supra., at 151. 
Ferrebee contends that the acts of the county leading up to 
the condemnation actions were "reprehensible and flagrantly 
abusive". Appeal Brief, at 44. In particular, Ferrebee points 
to an alleged lack of honesty on the part of the County in 
offering $275 per acre for Ferrebee's property when the County 
had prior appraisals for $4,500 an acre and $1,750 an acre. The 
history of the negotiations with Ferrebee were clearly and fully 
laid out in the County's original Appellate Brief. Nothing in 
the record supports Ferrebee's contention that the County was 
dishonest in its use of the $275 appraisal for the basis of its 
offer. However, for the sake of clarity, a review of the record 
reflects that the County's $275 offer was based on an appraisal 
of a thoroughly qualified appraiser, whose appraisal have been 
criticized by another appraiser and then he had been given an 
opportunity to respond to that criticism and to justify his 
appraisal. R. 435, at 101-6, 205-6, 437, at 391, Exhibit 13.The 
20 
other County appraisals which ranged from $4,500 an acre to $1750 
an acre could not be used for the basis for an offer to Ferrebee 
when the offer was made because they were out of date. It was 
during the County's preparations to make a final offers for the 
property that it was first discovered that property values in the 
area had dropped dramatically. R. 437, at 352-62. The county 
went through the review appraisal to properly certify that the 
$275 per acre offer was appropriate. 
Nothing in the record would indicate that the county did not 
have an honest belief in the propriety of its actions, and 
Ferrebee has pointed to nothing which would indicate that the 
county intended to defraud or take unconscionable advantage of 
him. 
The court's finding as to the good faith actions of the 
county are substantiated by the record, and the lower court did 
not abused its discretion in denying an award of attorneys fees. 
E. FERREBEE IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF COSTS IN THE FORM OF 
HIS EXPERT WITNESS FEES 
There is no statutory authority which would permit the lower 
court to award costs against the County in the form of Ferrebee's 
expert witness fees. Furthermore, Ferrebee has waiver his right 
to have the matter considered in this appeal because he failed to 
properly raise the issue before the lower court. 
Section 78-34-1 jet seq. which governs condemnation actions 
in Utah does not provided for an award of costs to the landowner 
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for his expenses in retaining an appraiser to provide an 
appraisal or testimony. Furthermore, the most recent statement 
of the Utah Courts on this subject indicates that they are not 
recoverable. Redevelopment Agency v. Daskalas, 785 P.2d 1112. 
1124 (Utah App. 1989) . 
Finally, Ferrebee did not fully raise the question of the 
award of cost before the lower court. In a discussion at the 
time the lower courts entered his Bench Ruling, Ferrebee's 
counsel asked for an award of cost, including the his expenses in 





One final point, your Honor, with respect to 
cost. Should I submit a bill of costs? 
Certainly the primary costs are the $12- or 
$13,000 in appraisal fees. The Court has 
adopted the appraisal fee — one of those 
appraisals. And I would be submitting a bill 
of costs and wonder if the Court could give 
me any direction whether those costs would be 
awarded. 
Well, do you have any comment? 
There is no provision for the award of cost, 
your Honor. 
I would state this to you: That you have the 
right to submit your cost bill. Right now, I 
would indicate to you that appraisal costs 
would not be a billable cost as far as what 
you would be entitled to under a cost bill. 
MR. SCHMUTZ: Your Honor, if I may have leave, 
I would like to argue that this is an unusual 
case where the issue is value, and it isn't 
as though an expert is being called to 
determine standard of care. The ultimate 
issue that the Court finds, that it's adopted 
in the form of the Cook appraisal — we were 
forced as a 
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defendant to set forth the value for the 
land. And I think this is a case where, 
under the discretion of the Court, those 
costs can be awarded. 
THE COURT: Well, I am not cuttinlg you off now. But I'll 
indicate to you that before you spent your 
time to argue it, you better have some law to 
give me as far as the costs are concerned. 
R. 431, at 8-9. Ferrebee's counsel did not pursue the matter 
further and did not provided the Court with any authority which 
would permit the Court to award the costs that he sought.14 
II. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court committed reversible error in awarding an 
enhance value to Ferrebee based on the property's proximity to the 
Airport. In addition the lower court abused its discretion in 
accepting Ferrebee's appraiser's appraisal as the basis for 
valuation. The Court should reject the findings and conclusions of 
the lower court and remand the matter for the entry of findings 
which are consistent with the appraisals provided by the County. 
Finally, the Court should reject Ferrebee's appeal on the 
issues of the lower court's use of the option evidence, attorneys' 
fees and costs and award the County its costs on appeal. 
DATED this ^ ^ day of January, 1992. 
Stoker & Thomas 
David B. Thomas 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
u
 Daskalas was handed down well after the Court entered its 
Bench Ruling in this case in August 29, 1989. 
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